Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments /
Autor principal: | Keefer, Philip (Autor/a) |
---|---|
Formato: | Libro |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Washington, DC :
The World Bank, Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy,
2001.
|
Colección: | Policy research working paper
2542 |
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