Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions : when are independent central banks irrelevant? /

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Keefer, Philip (Autor/a)
Formato: Libro
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Washington, DC : The World Bank, Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy, 2000.
Colección:Policy research working paper 2356
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040 |a Sistema de Bibliotecas de la Universidad de Costa Rica 
100 1 |a Keefer, Philip  |e Autor/a 
245 1 0 |a Bureaucratic delegation and political institutions :  |b when are independent central banks irrelevant? /  |c Philip Keefer, David Stasavage. 
260 |a Washington, DC :  |b The World Bank, Development Research Group Regulation and Competition Policy,  |c 2000. 
300 |a 48 páginas :  |b 2 gráficos en blanco y negro. 
490 0 |a Policy research working paper  |v 2356 
949 |a -AEM